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to review the agenci.es' substantive
decisions?
REVIEW UNDER NBPA
While the Environmental Impact State-
process of 9102(2)(c) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
USC 4321 et seq., would seem to insure
that agency decision-makers will take
environmental considerations to heart
when making their decisions, NEPA, un-
like other environmental legislation,
contains no provisions for judicial re-
view or enforcement of its mandate.
Likewise, the legislative history of
the Act provides little guidance on the
subject of review. As long as decision
makers pay lip service to environmental
question, will the courts be willing
In one of the earliest and still most
cited NEPA cases, Calvert Cliffs' Co-
ordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy
Commission, 449 F2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971), Judge Skelly-Wright, while not
expressly recognizing that NEPA creates
substantive rights, did state that
NEPA's procedural provisions do require
"a finely tuned and 'systemtic' bal-
ancing analysis in each instance," Id.
at 1113, and that a court could reverse
a decision on its merits if it were
"shown that the actual balance of costs
and benefits that was struck down was
arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental matters." Id.
at 1115. Thus, substantive review is
available under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, 5 USC 706.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Cors
of Engineers, 470 F2d 289 (8th Cir. 1973)
the Eighth Circuit relied on Calvert Cli-
ffs, but went one step further, explicit-
ly holding that "there is an agency oblii
gation to carry out the substantive re-
quirements of the Act" Id. at 298.
Even in this view, however, the standard
of review is a narrow one, but it does
impose substantive duties.
The Second Circuit has adopted a
standard which will allow for a very
limited amount of substantive review.
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence V. Federal Power Commission, 453
F2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), the Court states
that if "the Commission has consid-
ered all relevant factors, and where
the challenged findings ... are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, we
will not allow our personal views as
to the desirability of the result to
influence us in our decision." Id.
at . Accord, 1-291 Why? Assoc.
v. Burns, 517 F2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1974);
and Chelsea Neighborhood Assoc. v.
U.S. Postal Service, 516 F2d 378 (2d
Cir. 1975).
The Fourth Circuit, after some in-
itial wavering . has come down on
the side of the more searching stan-
dard of review, expressly agreeing
with the Eighth Circuit in Conser-
vation Council of North Carolina
v. Froehlke, 473 F2d 664 (4th Cir.
1973).
In another Bnvironmental Defense
Pund v. Corps of nginers, 492
V2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974), the
Fifth Circuit reviewed the state
of the law and changed its course,
stating that despite dicta in their
earlier decisions indicating that
agency substantive decisions were
not reviewable, "the majority and
better reasoned rule favors such
substantive review." Id. at 1139.
Two Circuits, the Ninth and Tenth,
have held that courts can review
compliance with NEPA's procedural re-
quireents only. Cad v. Morton,
627 F2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975), and
National Helium Corp. v. Morton,
455 F2d 650.(10th Cir. 1971).
The Supre Court has never ruled ,
squarely on the subject of substan-
tive judicial review of the Envir-
onmental Impact Statement process.
However, in Aberdeen and Rockfish
R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289
(1975), where the Court declined to
resolve the question, Justice Doug-
las, in his dissent, appeared to
favor a more searching standard of
substantive review. NEPA, he says,
"is more than a technical statute of
administrative procedure. It is a
comittment to the preservation of
our natural environment. The statute
language conveys the urgency of that
task..." Id. at 331. Regarding the
case before him, in which the lower
court had found the Interstate Com-
merce Commisssion's Impact Statement
inadequate on substantive grounds,
Douglas said that he would affirm
the judgement of the District Court
Which, "following the spirit of
NSPA, told the Commission to do
better. Id.
